According to many commentators, Davidson’s earlier work on philosophy of action and truth-theoretic semantics is the basis for his reputation, and his later forays into broader metaphysical and epistemological issues, and eventually into what became known as the triangulation argument, are much less successful. This book by two of his former students aims to change that perception. In Part One, Verheggen begins by providing an explanation and defense of the triangulation argument, then explores its implications for questions concerning semantic normativity (...) and reductionism, the social character of language and thought, and skepticism about the external world. In Part Two, Myers considers what the argument can tell us about reasons for action, and whether it can overcome skeptical worries based on claims about the nature of motivation, the sources of normativity and the demands of morality. The book reveals Davidson’s later writings to be full of innovative and important ideas that deserve much more attention than they are currently receiving. (shrink)

Can an effective argument against scepticism about objective values be modelled on Donald Davidson’s familiar argument against scepticism about external things?

Davidson's theory of radical interpretation, and his principle of charity, are well known in their application to beliefs and meanings, but rarely discussed in their application to desires and values. This is a pity, for they provide the makings of an argument for normative realism that is definitely worth exploring. After introducing Davidson's interpretation argument, I work through some familiar grounds for doubting that it applies to desires and values. Foremost among these are doubts about the extent to which holism (...) is true of desires and about the sense in which values or reasons could be thought to be objective. I conclude that while Davidson does not always address these doubts as thoroughly or as carefully as one might wish, he clearly sees how the argument here has to go, and he has at his disposal plausible responses to a good number of the challenges that are likely to arise. (shrink)

Leist worries that by tying the ideal of cooperation to the aim of promoting the good I exhibit a bias towards consequentialism, and that this in turn leads me to downsize the role to be played by the ideal of cooperation within moral theory. I maintain that no bias is exhibited towards consequentialism but acknowledge that realism is being favoured over constructivism. I further argue that the role assigned to the ideal of cooperation is as large as realism permits.

RÉSUMÉEn réponse à Paul Hurley, je soutiens que l'argument de la triangulation de Donald Davidson ne peut s'appliquer aux croyances normatives que si ces croyances correspondent à des propriétés à la fois normatives et causales. L'argument engage donc Davidson à une forme de naturalisme non-réductif et étonnamment non-révisionniste. En réponse à Kirk Ludwig, je soutiens que Davidson avait de bonnes raisons d'abandonner les théories humiennes des pro-attitudes, parce qu'il avait de bonnes raisons d'accepter la forme de naturalisme non-réductive et non-révisionniste (...) qui émerge une fois que l'argument de la triangulation est appliqué aux croyances normatives. (shrink)

Robert Myers presents an original moral theory which charts a course between the extremes of consequentialism and contractualism. He puts forward a radically new case for the existence of both agent-neutral and agent-relative values, and gives an innovative answer to the question how such disparate values can be weighed against each other. The result is a theory of morality which combines a balanced account of its content with a ringing affirmation of its authority.

Robert Myers presents an original moral theory which charts a course between the extremes of consequentialism and contractualism, portraying morality not simply as a matter of promoting the overall good but rather as a matter of cooperating in its promotion. This gives him answers to two of the most vexing questions in moral philosophy: how can increasing general welfare and respecting individual rights be equally fundamental features of moral activity, and what gives morality's demands their special character of inescapability?

This book brings together a wide range of innovative reflections on the pivotal role that Davidson’s concept of agency plays in his later philosophy and its impact on his epistemology, his philosophy of language and mind, and his philosophy of values. The authors critically assess central elements of Davidson’s program and offer reappraisals of his seminal contributions to, and his continuing influence on, the development of contemporary philosophy. By focusing on agency, the book reveals Davidson’s views to have been more (...) dynamic and less reductive than previously acknowledged – pointing toward important new possibilities not only in the theory of knowledge, but also in the philosophy of mind. It is a valuable resource both for experts on Davidson’s philosophy and for those interested in central topics in the theory of action, the philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of values. It is also of interest to researchers in adjoining disciplines, such as cognitive science, linguistics, and psychology. (shrink)